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ABSTRACT
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source of funds.  We show that industries with higher dependence on trade credit financing exhibit higher
rates of growth in countries with weaker financial institutions. Furthermore, consistent with barriers to
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in the size of pre-existing firms.
Raymond Fisman Inessa Love
Graduate School of Business The World Bank
Columbia University MC3-300
614 Uris Hall 1818 H Street NW
New York, NY 10027 Washington, DC 20433
and NBER Tel: (202) 458-0590
Tel: (212) 854-9157 Fax: (202) 522-1155
Fax: (212) 316-9219
Email: rf250@columbia.edu  3
            I. Introduction 
In recent years, there has been increasing interest in the economics literature in the role of 
financial intermediaries in promoting economic growth.  Recent papers have shown that 
improved financial market development is associated with growth, using a variety of 
methodologies and datasets.
1  One of the basic explanations for this pattern is that the financial 
sector serves to reallocate funds from those with an excess of capital, given their investment 
opportunities, to those with a shortage of funds (relative to opportunities).  Thus, an economy 
with well-developed financial institutions will be better able to allocate resources to projects that 
yield the highest returns. 
  This allocative role of financial institutions in promoting development was the focus of 
Rajan and Zingales (1998), who found that industrial sectors with a greater need for external 
finance develop disproportionately faster in countries with more developed financial markets.  
This then begs the question of whether firms with high return projects in countries with poorly 
developed financial institutions are able to take steps to mitigate the effects of deficient (formal) 
financial intermediaries, and if so, how.  One answer, implicit in Rajan and Zingales, is that 
firms will be forced to rely more on internally generated funds.  Recent work by Petersen and 
Rajan (1997), suggests that implicit borrowing from suppliers may provide an additional 
possibility.  They found that, among small firms in the United States, those with less well-
established banking relationships held significantly higher levels of accounts payable.  Similarly, 
firms in MSA’s with a relative scarcity of financial institutions carried higher levels of accounts 
                                                 
1 Perhaps the earliest work relating financial market development to economic growth is Cameron (1967). More 
recent work that examines this relationship using cross-country data includes Levine and King (1993) and 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996).  More sophisticated approaches have been utilized by: Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), who use within-country variation in industry characteristics; Bekaert et al (2000), who make use of time-
series variation in looking at the effect of financial liberalization on growth; and Rousseau and Wachtel (1998), who 
look at the links between the intensity of financial intermediation and economic performance in five industrialized 
countries.   4
payable.  They suggest that their results imply that trade credit is used as a source of 'financing of 
last resort' by very constrained firms.  Nilsen (2000) looks at this issue from another angle, 
showing that during monetary contractions small firms, which are likely to be more credit 
constrained, react by borrowing more from their suppliers. 
  Now, even the most constrained of American firms face far less scarcity of funding from 
formal institutions than companies in many other countries, where stock markets are in their 
infancy, and formal lenders are rare.  A natural extension of Petersen and Rajan's reasoning is 
that firms with financing needs in such countries will be more likely to fall back on supplier 
financing in the form of trade credit as a means of funding growth.   
Suppose that it is the case that trade credit is a substitute for institutional financing where 
financial intermediaries are scarce, and further that it is also true that firms in certain industries 
find it inherently easier to access trade credit, for reasons that will be discussed in the next 
section.  Then, this would imply a substitutability between 'trade credit suitability' and financial 
market development.  That is, financial market development should matter disproportionately 
more for firms that cannot make use of trade credit financing, or conversely, firms with access to 
trade credit financing should face (relatively) fewer difficulties in countries with less developed 
financial markets. 
Using the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998), we test this hypothesis, using data 
from a panel of 37 industries and 44 countries.  Consistent with the basic hypothesis outlined 
above, we find that firms in industries with higher rates of accounts payable exhibit higher rates 
of growth in countries with relatively weak financial institutions.
2 We find these results to be 
                                                 
2 We wish to emphasize that our conclusions on the substitutability of trade credit and bank credit are based on the 
within country variation in trade credit usage across industries. Thus, our results imply substitution between these 
two sources of financing at the micro level, which is consistent with previous findings for US firms by Petersen and 
Rajan (1997), described above.  However, since both sources of financing are likely to be positively correlated with   5
very strong, and robust to a wide variety of specifications.  However, since trade credit, 
particularly in the absence of effective legal enforcement, requires trust and reputation, startup 
firms may have more difficulty in benefiting from trade credit financing, as described above.
3  
Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that when growth is measured by the creation of new 
establishments, ‘credit intensive’ industries do not grow significantly more rapidly in countries 
with underdeveloped capital markets. 
The rest of the paper will be structured as follows: Section II will review the primary 
theories of trade credit provision, and discuss why they imply an industry-specific element to 
trade credit access.  In section III, we discuss the data sets used in the analysis.  Our basic results 
are reported in section IV; we give our conclusions and discussion in section V.  
 
II.  Theories of Trade Credit Provision 
There are numerous theories that provide explanations for the provision of credit by 
suppliers.  These theories often pertain to particular aspects of market structure and/or product 
characteristics, and suggest that certain industries may have a greater ability to utilize trade credit 
than others.  Since we will be using an industry-specific measure of trade credit intensiveness, 
we will begin by outlining these basic theories of trade credit provision, with particular reference 
to industry specificity.  Most theories of trade credit provision fall into one of the following 
categories: 1) comparative advantage in liquidation, 2) price discrimination by suppliers, 3) 
warranty for product quality, and 4) customized products. 
                                                                                                                                                             
contract enforcement, legal or otherwise, in a cross-country regression one might observe a positive correlation 
between trade credit provision and formal financial intermediation, which could be incorrectly interpreted as 
representing a complementarity between these two sources of financing.  This highlights the importance of utilizing 
cross-industry differences, which allows us to better control for heterogeneity across countries in factors such as 
legal enforcement.  
 
3 See, for example, McMillan and Woodruff (2000) for evidence on the relationship between credit access and firm 
age.   6
First, several authors have suggested that credit provision will be more likely in 
circumstances where there is easier resale of the product being sold, since this will allow the 
seller to seize and resell its product if default occurs (see, for example, Mian and Smith (1992)  
and Frank and Maksimovic (1998)).  Ease of resale will clearly be related to a number of 
characteristics of these inputs: depreciation; firm-specificity; inventory stocks.  An implication of 
this theory is that industries that utilize undifferentiated raw materials, and that are required to 
hold large amounts of raw materials inventories (relative to finished goods inventories) will be 
better able to obtain trade credit financing where necessary.
4   
The second theory involves price discrimination as a motive for trade credit provision by 
suppliers. Brennan, Maksimovic and Zezhner (1988) present this argument, claiming that low 
competition among suppliers in an input market may create incentives to discriminate among 
cash and credit customers. This would happen if, first, the demand elasticity (or the reservation 
price) of credit customers is lower than that of cash customers, and second, if there is adverse 
selection in the credit market.  In addition, trade credit could be used as a strategic instrument in 
the oligopolistic supplier market. Depending on the degree of competition in the input market, 
some industries may therefore be more prone to price discrimination by their suppliers. If some 
industries are ‘naturally’ concentrated (e.g., because of high fixed costs), and use of inputs are 
reasonably similar within a given industry, access to trade credit from upstream firms will also 
be similar. In support of this, an early study by Pryor (1972) finds that the rank ordering of 
industrial concentration is highly correlated among 12 developed countries. 
Some industries may require trade credit as a guarantee for product quality, as in Long, 
Malitz and Ravid (1994). According to their theory, the supplier will willingly extend credit to 
                                                 
4 This hypothesis is, in fact, borne out by our data: we find that, in a between industry regression of accounts 
payable over assets on raw materials inventories over assets, the coefficient on inventories is positive and 
statistically significant.  Results available from the authors.   7
allow the customer sufficient time to test the product. Similarly, in Lee and Stowe (1993), and 
Emery and Nayar (1998), the choice of trade credit terms offered by the supplier can serve as a 
signal of product quality. Certainly, some products, for example high-tech or newly developed 
products, need more quality assurance for their inputs than others, such as commodities.  
Another theory of credit provision comes from a model in a recent paper by Cunat 
(2000).  In this paper, supplier-customer relationships that have tailor made products, learning by 
doing, or other sources of sunk costs, will generate a surplus that will increase with the length of 
the relationship. This will increase the amount of credit that suppliers are willing to provide, 
since it ties firms to particular suppliers, thereby increasing the scope for punishment of 
nonpayment. Similar to the 'inspection' discussion outlined above, industries with more complex 
input needs will better fit this argument. 
Finally, of particular relevance for this paper, Smith (1987) provides a theory of credit 
provision that spans several categories, using arguments related to product quality guarantees, 
market power and sunk costs to generate a model of trade credit terms. She argues that credit 
terms will be uniform within industries and differ across industries. The empirical support for 
this model is presented in a recent paper by Ng, Smith and Smith (1999), who document wide 
variation in credit terms across industries but little variation within industries. This evidence 
lends some credibility to our assumption about the industry-specific use of trade credit.  We 
provide further evidence in the Data section below, in support of our claim that there is an 
industry-specific element to trade credit intensiveness. 
We have laid out, in this section, a number of theories of trade credit provision that may 
have industry-specific components to them.  It is worth noting that the purpose of this paper is 
not to assess which of these theories are primarily responsible for differences across industries in   8
reliance on trade credit.  Rather, for us, it is sufficient to note that there are many reasons to 
believe that such differences should exist, to document that such differences do in fact exist in 
our data, and to show that these differences are consistent and persist over time.  
One additional concern related to the theory of credit provision is that many of the 
enforcement or information problems that may prevent the establishment of financial institutions 
may potentially affect the ability of firms to obtain trade credit financing.  In particular, where 
rule of law is weak, firms will not have legal recourse in the case of credit nonpayment.  This is 
of concern, since we are claiming that trade credit exists as a substitute for bank financing where 
the latter is scarce.  We will argue, however, that even though weak creditor protection and 
imperfect information will affect both formal intermediaries and trade credit providers, trade 
creditors may mitigate these problems better than formal lenders for several reasons. These 
include advantages in 1) information acquisition, 2) the renegotiation/liquidation process, and 3) 
enforcement.  
The first set of advantages stems from the fact that suppliers are thought to have a cost 
advantage over banks in acquisition of information about the financial health of the buyers. For 
example, Mian and Smith (1992) argue that monitoring of credit-quality can occur as a by-
product of selling if a manufacturer’s sales representatives regularly visit the borrower.     
Similarly, suppliers often offer two-part trade credit, where a substantial discount is offered for 
relatively early repayment, such as a two percent discount for payments made within ten days.  
The failure of a buyer to take this discount could serve as a very strong and early signal of 
financial distress.  Biais and Gollier (1993) assume that suppliers have different signals about the 
customer’s probability of default than do banks, and furthermore, that the bank will extend more 
credit if it observes the offering of the trade credit by supplier. Alternatively, Smith (1987)   9
argues that the choice of the trade credit terms made can be used as a screening device to elicit 
information about buyers’ creditworthiness.   
The other arguments follow directly from the preceding discussion: because of 
advantages in the liquidation process, described above, the supplier would lend to a customer 
even if the bank would not.   Finally, sunk costs and repeated interaction (as in the model by 
Cunat (2000) discussed above) may generate   surplus split among the supplier and the customer 
and this surplus will give the supplier an advantage over the bank lending in enforcement.  
These models taken together provide theoretical grounds for arguing that in the situations 
when bank credit is unavailable, trade credit could serve as a (weak) substitute.
5,6   
 
III. Data 
The data are primarily drawn from Rajan and Zingales (1998) (referred to below as RZ) 
and are described in detail in their paper. A complete list of the variables used in this paper with 
the original sources is given in the Table 1. Our primary outcome variable is real growth in 
valued added, estimated for each of 37 industries in 43 countries (UNCTAD, 1999).
7  T o  
estimate each industry’s dependence on external finance, RZ use US firms from the Compustat 
database.  Similarly, we use Compustat to calculate an industry-level “propensity for trade 
credit”.  As in RZ, we interpret the US data as ‘industry representative’ – the actual use of trade 
                                                 
5 These arguments are also consistent with the cross-country pattern in rates of trade credit provision, which is 
uncorrelated with financial development.  This is presumably because the counteracting effects described above 
cancel one another out in the aggregate.  Results available from the authors. 
6 Note that an alternative theory of trade credit is that it exists to decrease transaction costs of making payments on 
delivery  (Ferris, 1981). According to this explanation, trade credit usage by an industry could be interpreted as the 
level of transaction costs specific for that industry (for example, some industries need more frequent deliveries of 
inputs than others and therefore transaction costs will be higher).  It is plausible to argue that financial development 
reduces the transaction costs of payments and therefore will benefit firms (or industries) with high transaction costs 
disproportionately. This generates the following alternative hypothesis - that industries with higher reliance on trade 
credit are relatively better off in countries with more developed financial intermediaries. Our results, reported below, 
strongly reject this alternative hypothesis. 
7 Consistent with RZ, we drop observations with growth rates above 100 percent, to eliminate the influence of 
outliers.   10
credit will vary across countries, and the US firms are likely to represent the desired (optimal) 
level of trade credit used by firms in a given industry.  Using the US trade credit data implicitly 
assumes that trade credit usage by industries in US is representative of trade credit usage in other 
countries. This is a strong assumption, borne of necessity, as we do not have adequate cross-
country data on trade credit usage.  However, it is an assumption that has a strong theoretical 
rationale.  Using each country’s individual “dependence on trade credit” would be problematic, 
for reasons of endogeneity: one of our basic assumptions is that trade credit usage is a response 
to poor financial development.  To capture the underlying ‘technological affinity’ of an industry 
for trade credit dependence, it is more appropriate to look at a country with well-developed 
markets, where trade credit choices are, in some sense, optimal.  The United States, which is 
excluded from our regressions, provides a potential ‘exogenous’ measure of this. 
For most of our analyses, we use the entire universe of Compustat firms, which is merged 
with CRSP data to obtain correct industry codes.  To be consistent with previous work, we take 
1980-1989 as our main sample period, and for robustness tests we use data from 1970- 1998.  In 
examining the growth of the number of firms in each industry, we also provide results based on 
measures of trade credit and financial dependence calculated from firms in the smallest quartile 
in each industry, by sales.  If there are systematic differences across industries regarding access 
to various forms of financing of small relative to large firms, this should provide a better 
indicator of the propensity to access trade credit (and other forms of financing, in the case of 
financial dependence) of startups.  Based on a similar rationale, we also provide results utilizing 
only relatively young firms.  
To obtain industry-level measures of trade credit usage we use the ratio of accounts 
payable to total assets (APAY/TA), the same measure of the demand for credit used by Petersen   11
and Rajan (1997).
 8  To obtain a value for each industry, we then take industry medians of the 
ratios over all firm-years in the relevant time period. This ratio gives the percentage of total 
assets that is financed by trade credit, and hence represents an industry’s ability to rely on 
informal credit rather then institutional financing. Since trade credit may be used to finance 
working capital (current assets), and may also be loaded up on and rolled over to finance 
investment for firms with no other source of funds, we concur with Petersen and Rajan that total 
firm assets is the most appropriate deflator.
9  As an alternative measure, we also use the ratio of 
accounts payable to total liabilities, which measures the percentage of liabilities that are covered 
by trade credit, and obtain similar results. The correlation between these two measures is 0.84.
10   
An important robustness test of our results involves examining the joint performance of 
our trade credit measures and RZ’s measures of external finance. Our primary definition of trade 
credit reliance is a stock measure, i.e. the ratio of the stock of accounts payable to the stock of 
total assets, while the original RZ measure of external finance is a flow measure (denoted by 
∆EXTFIN), which measures the proportion of capital expenditures (i.e. the change in fixed 
capital), financed by an inflow of external financing.  
In order to compare our results to those of RZ, we must also construct a stock measure of 
dependence on outside financing.  The stock measure most closely analogous to that of RZ's 
original measure is the proportion of the firm's assets that have not been financed internally. We 
                                                 
8 One possible problem with this measure of credit is that payables may reflect factoring (payables that have been 
sold to a third party), rather than credit owed to suppliers.  If this is the case, then factoring may show up as private 
credit.  By this argument, however, industries where factoring is common should actually benefit from financial 
development, as measured by PRIV (see below).  While factoring is a relatively small proportion of receivables, this 
does suggest that the effect of supplier credit may be even stronger than that which we report in the paper. 
9 Note that we also experimented with deflators based on inventories and capital expenditures separately, and found 
that our basic results held for both measures, though more weakly in both cases. 
10  We also experimented with other industry-level measures such as: accounts receivable (as a measure for the 
industry’s need to provide its customers with the credit); inventories; net credit (difference of accounts payable and 
accounts receivable); and sales to capital ratio as a measure of capital intensity. The main results on accounts 
payable were always robust to the inclusion of any of these additional measures (the results are available on 
request).   12
construct this stock measure of external finance as the difference between total assets and 
retained earnings, deflated by total assets (EXTFIN).
11 Like APAY/TA, EXTFIN is an industry 
median of ratios over all firm-years.  Thus, by construction, both measures (APAY/TA and 
EXTFIN) have total assets as a common denominator, which further increases their 
comparability.  It is important to note that our constructed stock measure of external finance and 
original flow measure of external finance used by RZ are highly correlated (see Table III),
12 
which gives us further confidence in the similarity of our stock measure of external finance and 
the original flow measure.   
An alternative to constructing a stock measure of financial dependence is to construct a 
flow measure of trade credit reliance, more in the spirit of RZ’s approach.  The closest flow 
analog to APAY/TA is the change in accounts payable over the 1980s, deflated by the change in 
total assets (∆APAY/∆TA). This gives the total proportion of new assets accumulated over the 
decade that were financed by increases in payables.  
In our main results, we use stock measures of both financial dependence and trade credit 
reliance.
13  The stock approach provides a number of advantages.  Most importantly, since 
growth during the 1980s is the outcome variable in all regressions, flow measures may be 
susceptible to picking up the effects of correlated shocks across countries, where these shocks 
                                                 
11 Retained earnings (Compustat data item 36) is a portion of the book value of equity, equal to the cumulative 
earnings of a company less total dividend distributions to shareholders. Thus, if positive, it represents the 
accumulated stock of internally generated funds. In the case of negative retained earnings, which happens if the 
company paid out more than it earned, we assume that the company is was entirely financed externally (i.e. 
internally generated funds are zero).  
12 The correlation is 0.82, significant at 1%, when both measures are constructed with the data for 80’s and 0.74, 
significant at 1% for the data for the 70’s. 
13 In this sense, our results using the stock measure of external finance may also be seen as a robustness check of 
Rajan and Zingales’ original results. However, we want to emphasize that we use a stock measure of external 
finance not to test RZ’s results, but to test the robustness of our results on trade credit to the inclusion of a 
comparable measure of external finance. All of our results hold when we use RZ’s original flow measure of external 
finance instead of our stock measure.  However, using a stock and a flow measure in the same regression makes any 
comparison of the relative effects of the variables difficult to interpret.      13
are more highly correlated in more similar countries.  Furthermore, since flow measures are 
essentially differenced versions of the stock measures, we may be differencing out important 
(and persistent) information about the industry-specificity of financing.
14  On the other hand, 
using the flow measure of trade credit financing provides a more direct comparison with RZ's 
results.  We present the results using both flow measures as a robustness check of our main 
results.
15 
For both our stock and flow measures, exact definitions are given in Table I. 
To construct measures of financial development we use several components available in 
the RZ dataset (the original source of financial development data is International Financial 
Statistics). Our main measure is the ratio of total credit held by private (non-governmental) 
organizations to GDP (PRIV). We concentrate on debt, since the theories laid out in the 
preceding section focus on trade credit financing as an alternative to funding by financial 
intermediaries, rather than equity or bond market financing. Furthermore, we focus on private 
(rather than public) debt, since governmental use of credit is often thought to be contaminated by 
political considerations that would not necessarily lead to optimal resource allocation.  We also 
report regressions utilizing other measures of financial development such as stock market 
development (given by market capitalization to GDP), and total (government plus private) credit 
use; we find that our results are not sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of these other sources of 
financing.  
Table II contains data on the median levels of accounts payable used by industries in the 
US (both stock and flow measures). The ratios for APAY/TA vary from 5% to about 15% with a 
                                                 
14 Consistent with this, we find that our stock measures are more highly correlated across decades than our flow 
measures.  See below. 
15 Using flows may also have the further benefit of being less sensitive to inter-industry heterogeneity in trade credit 
propensities across countries due to factors such as differences in the terms and pricing of credit; see for example 
Ng, Smith and Smith (1999).   14
mean of 9%, and the ratios of ∆APAY/∆TA vary from 1.9% to 21% with a mean of 7%. Thus, 
even within the US, trade credit is a significant source of financing.  By comparison, the mean of 
short-term debt to assets is 3.4% and the mean of long-term debt to assets is 16%.
16 The 
industries with the lowest usage of trade credit are: drugs; leather; pottery; and pulp and paper; 
and the industries with the highest usage are: spinning (a slight outlier and a relatively small 
category); motor vehicles; and petroleum refineries.  These patterns fit, at least anecdotally, with 
the theories laid out in the previous section.  For example, petroleum refineries are raw material 
intensive, and utilize relatively undifferentiated inputs.  At the other extreme, the pharmaceutical 
industry often makes use of product specific inputs that are difficult to resell.  We recognize, 
however, that it is always possible to come up with post hoc explanations for such patterns in the 
data.  Hence, we prefer to focus on the stability of trade credit ratios across time, by industry, as 
an indication of the industry specificity of trade credit. If our claim that trade credit is a 
meaningful and stable industry characteristic is correct, it should to be persistent across time 
periods.
17   
Table III shows correlations of industry-level measures of trade credit use and 
dependence on external financing across different time periods. Our main variable (APAY/TA) 
is measured over the 1980’s to match the timing of the industry growth data. The correlation for 
APAY/TA between the 1980’s and 1990’s is 0.83, and between the 1970’s and 1980’s it is 0.79. 
This high persistence in trade credit usage provides strong support for our assumption of the 
industry-specificity of trade credit. Correlations are somewhat weaker for the flow measure of 
                                                 
16 Cunat (2000) reports that US is on the low side in the cross-country comparison of trade credit usage, so for most 
other countries trade credit is even more important as a source of financing. 
17 Another interesting observation, also consistent with the idea of industry-specific ‘propensity for trade credit’, is 
that in regressions of trade credit intensiveness on firm size, about five times more variation is explained by between 
industry variation than within industry variation.  So, to the extent that size is a predictor of credit access, most of 
this seems to result from some industries having ‘naturally’ larger firms, and also being naturally suited to credit 
access.   15
trade credit.
18  By comparison, the correlation for the stock measure of external financing 
dependence, EXTFIN, between the 1980’s and 1990’s is 0.77, and between the 1970’s and 
1980’s it is 0.62, which is almost the same as the correlation between the 1970’s and 1980’s for 
the original RZ flow measure of external finance (see Table III). Finally, note that for both 
APAY/TA and EXTFIN, the stock measures are highly correlated with the flow measures.  
 
IV. Results 
IV.1. Main results 
Our main hypothesis is that industries that are more “dependent” on trade credit will be 
relatively better off in countries with less developed institutional finance.  
The regression implied by this conjecture is the following: 
 
GROWTHci = αi + ξc + β*PRIVc*(APAY/TA)i + εci      (1) 
 
where c denotes country, i denotes industry, and we expect a negative sign on the interaction 
term PRIV*APAY/TA. We use industry and country dummies (αi and ξc) to control for all 
unobservable sources of value added growth specific to each country and each industry, and 
there is thus no need for PRIV and APAY/TA to enter the regression on their own. The main 
results are given in Table IV. Model 1 presents a result analogous to those in RZ’s paper, using 
instead our stock measure of external dependence on finance, EXTFIN, and our country-level 
measure of (private) financial intermediary development (PRIV); as with the original paper, we 
find that industries that are more dependent on external financing grow more rapidly in countries 
                                                 
18 For our flow measure of trade credit the correlation between the 1970’s and 1980’s is 0.43 and between the 1980’s 
and 1990’s  it is 0.59, both significant at 1%.    16
with more developed financial markets (a positive coefficient on the interaction term, 
EXTFIN*PRIV).
19 Model 2 shows our main finding - the negative coefficient on the interaction 
of the industry-level measure of accounts payable scaled by total assets (APAY/TA), and 
PRIV.
20 This coefficient is significant at 1% (all errors in this paper are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity), consistent with our main hypothesis that industries that are more dependent 
on trade credit have a relative advantage in countries with less developed financial 
intermediaries. The magnitude of the effect of our main interaction on value added growth may 
be thought of in the following terms: consider a move from the country at the 75th percentile of 
private financial intermediary development (e.g., Korea) to the country at the 25th percentile 
(e.g., Egypt). According to our calculations, this will widen the gap in growth rates between the 
industries at the 25th (Printing and Publishing) and 75th (Plastics) percentiles of trade credit 
intensity by 1.2 percent.  This difference in differences is virtually identical to the interaction 
effect described in RZ.  The stock measure of financial dependence, more comparable to our 
measure of trade credit dependence, implies an effect that is also very similar in magnitude.
21 As 
noted in RZ, this order of magnitude is similar to other explanatory variables used in growth 
regressions such as investment’s share of GDP and per capita income.   
 Model 3 shows that this finding is robust to exclusion of the fraction of industry’s share 
in total manufacturing, which is used as a control variable in the rest of the regressions. Model 4 
shows that including both APAY/TA and EXTFIN leaves the significance of both interaction 
terms virtually unchanged, suggesting that the trade credit channel provides an effect on growth 
                                                 
19 Note that we use private credit as our measure of financial development, once again in order to make direct 
comparisons with our results on trade credit.  In the robustness section, we will utilize more directly the RZ 
interaction term, when we use all forms of financing as our measure of financial development. 
20 Throughout the paper we refer to this product of APAY/TA and PRIV as “our main interaction”. 
21 The difference in PRIV between the 25
th and 75
th percentiles is 0.3 and the difference in APAY/TA is 
approximately 0.02 which, multiplied by the coefficient estimate, implies a change in the growth rate of 1.2%, as 
reported in the main text. For the stock measure of external finance the difference between the 25
th and 75
th 
percentiles is approximately 0.1, which implies a change in the growth rate of about 0.9%.   17
that is independent of the external financing channel. As a final robustness check, we also 
investigate a model without country and industry fixed effects, where we include APAY/TA and 
PRIV as independent regressors, and find similar results (see model 5). 
 
IV.2. Composition of capital markets  
 
In Table V we check for the sensitivity of the results to alternative measures of financial 
development to explore which of the aspects of financial development are stronger substitutes for 
trade credit. In model 1, we look at total financial development (FD), the sum of market 
capitalization and total domestic credit, deflated by GDP, the measure utilized by RZ.  We find 
that the coefficient on the interaction term, APAY*FD is somewhat lower than that of our main 
interaction term.
22  The coefficient on EXTFIN*FD is similarly lower. 
Model 2 uses total domestic credit to GDP, rather than private domestic credit to GDP as 
used in our main measure PRIV. The result is still significant at the 1% level, though marginally 
smaller in magnitude. Next, in model 3, we look at RZ’s measure of market capitalization to see 
whether stock market development or financial intermediary development is a stronger substitute 
for trade credit. The interaction with market capitalization is significant, but only at the 5% level; 
in contrast, measures based on domestic credit or private domestic credit are always significant 
at 1%.  Moreover, when we include interactions with both PRIV and market capitalization in the 
same regression (model 4), the coefficient on market capitalization is only significant at 10% and 
is considerably lower in magnitude. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that it is 
financial intermediaries rather than stock markets that primarily act as close substitutes for trade 
credit. 
                                                 
22 Note, however, that the variable FD has a standard deviation of 0.38, while PRIV has a standard deviation of 0.20.   18
A few additional regressions highlight the robustness of our primary findings.  When we 
include both total domestic credit and private credit in the same regression (model 5), the 
significance of domestic credit disappears.  This is effectively capturing the fact that, after 
controlling for the presence of private credit, additional domestic credit (i.e., credit to public 
organizations) is irrelevant for explaining our results. Finally, we test whether our main result 
could be caused by a simple income (i.e. GDP) effect, rather than financial institutions’ 
development, by including APAY/TA interacted with log GDP per capita. Model 6 shows that 
this is not the case: the interaction of APAY/TA with GDP is not significant, while our main 
interaction is still significant at the 1% level.
23   
 
IV.3. Growth in average firm size versus growth in number of firms. 
 
In Table VI we decompose growth in value added into growth in the total number of 
firms in the industry and growth in the average size of individual firms. This addresses the 
question of whether trade credit is a more important source of growth for new firms (growth in 
the number of firms) or for more mature firms. In models 1 and 2 we use growth in the average 
size of firms as the dependent variable, and find that the coefficient on our main interaction is 
significant at 1%. By contrast, the effect of our main interaction on growth in the number of 
firms is not significant at conventional levels (models 3 and 4). Collectively, these results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that for young firms, which have not yet had a chance to establish 
                                                 
23 While the focus of this paper is on trade credit effects, rather than financial dependence more generally, we 
include our stock measure of financial dependence in all of the preceding models to highlight the robustness of our 
results to its inclusion, and also to further probe the sensitivity of financial dependence to different types of financial 
development.  We find that these results also emphasize the importance of private domestic credit. If all models in 
Table V are run excluding the external finance interactions, the results on trade credit are unaffected.    19
reputations for credit worthiness, trade credit is a less accessible source of substitute financing 
than it is for mature firms. 
Our measure of trade credit dependence is calculated using all firms in each industry.  If 
there is a significant difference in trade credit usage between small and large firms, this could 
create a bias against finding any effect on the growth of startups, due to measurement error. To 
ensure that this is not driving our results, we run several robustness checks based on measures 
for trade credit and external finance calculated using only small firms or young firms.  In the 
calculations based on small firms, we use only firms in the smallest 25
th percentile, by sales, for 
each industry.  For calculations based on young firms, we use only firms with an IPO date of 
1970 or later.
24  Consistent with the results using the full sample of firms, the results using small 
firms (models 5 and 6) do not show any significant effect of our main interaction term on growth 
in the number of firms. We obtain similar results when our measure of trade credit reliance is 
based on young firms (models 7 and 8).   
 
 IV.4. Robustness 
 
  
We begin our robustness checks by reproducing all of our main results using flow   
measures of trade credit and external finance instead of the stock measures used previously.  The 
flow measure of trade credit is given by the change in accounts payable over the change in total 
assets (∆APAY/∆TA) and the flow measure of external finance is the original RZ measure of 
financial dependence (see Table 1 for complete definitions). The results presented in Table VII 
are consistent with our previous conclusions. Model 1 shows that the trade credit interaction with 
                                                 
24 To be more precise, the starting date is the date in which the firm first appears in the CRSP database, which is 
almost always the listing date. Note furthermore that using 1975 (which avoids the issue of the founding of the 
NASDAQ exchange in 1971) as a cutoff point does not change the results.   20
PRIV is negative and significant at 1%. While its coefficient is about half the size of the 
coefficient for the stock measure, the standard deviation for the flow measure is twice as large.  
Hence, the total effect is similar in magnitude to that implied by our main results. In model 2 we 
add the RZ flow measure of external finance and find that it is significant at 1%.  The magnitude 
of the effect implied by its coefficient is similarly close to that implied by the results based on 
our stock measure. The coefficient on our flow trade credit interaction variable is not affected by 
the addition of this external finance measure. In model 3 we use a different measure of financial 
development (FD, which is the sum of domestic credit and market capitalization, utilized by RZ) 
and find that our results are not affected by this replacement.  In model 4 we add interactions of 
both trade credit and external finance measures with log GDP per capita to test for the income 
effect and find that our results are still significant at the 1% level.  
Next, we reproduce our main results on the growth in number and average size of firms 
using both flow measures. Again, we find that trade credit is a significant source of financing 
only for mature firms (i.e. growth in average size of firms in model 5) but do not observe any 
effect on growth in number of firms (see models 6-8; model 6 uses the whole sample, model 7 
uses only small firms and model 8 uses only young firms, similar to the results reported in 
section IV.3). The flow measure of external finance is significant in all regressions, however, 
indicating that external finance is the only significant source of growth for startup firms, while 
mature firms can make use of trade credit financing as well. 
Table VIII explores the robustness of our results to alternative definitions of trade credit 
dependence. In models 1 and 2 we use APAY/TL (accounts payable scaled by total liabilities) as 
a measure of trade credit dependence, and find that this alternative definition does not affect our 
results. We confirm that our main results are unaffected by the choice of time period: models 3   21
and 4 use APAY/TA and EXTFIN measured over the 1970’s and in models 5 and 6 use 
APAY/TA and EXTFIN measured over the 1990’s. Thus, our main result is not sensitive to a 
different scaling factor or different time horizons.  
Next, we address the question of reverse causality in financial development. The 
argument here is that if the country’s economy contains more industries that rely more on trade 
credit, there will be less need for formal intermediaries to develop. This is a weak argument, 
since first, the presence of trade credit still leaves a lot of room for formal credit markets to 
develop. Second, trade credit seems to be a second best option, as firms that have access to bank 
credit prefer it to the use of trade credit (see Petersen and Rajan (1997)).  Nevertheless, following 
RZ, we run our main regression using instrumental variables with legal origin dummies as 
instruments for financial development. In model 7 we find that our main result is still significant, 
although now only at 6% level.   Finally, we use accounting standards as a proxy for financial 
intermediary development and still find a negative relationship (model 8). This could be 
interpreted as evidence in support of information-based theories of trade credit advantages, since 
with poor accounting standards, less information is available for financial intermediaries, thereby 
tilting the balance in favor of supplier financing. However, this result is somewhat weaker than 
our other results: the significance is only 10%, though this is partially a reflection of the decline 
in sample size (about 20%).    
 
 
 V. Conclusions  
In this paper, we have shown that firms in countries with less developed financial 
markets appear to substitute informal credit provided by their suppliers to finance growth. Using   22
the methodology pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998), we find that industries that are more 
dependent on trade credit financing grow relatively more rapidly in countries with less developed 
financial intermediaries. The result is robust to the addition of various industry-level measures, 
alternative financial development measures, and exclusion of influential observations. We also 
find that trade credit usage affects growth in the average size of firms rather than the growth in 
the number of firms. This is consistent with ‘reputation-based’ theories of trade credit, which 
argue that new firms will have greater difficulties in obtaining trade credit.  
This paper uncovers an important and significant role for trade credit as a source of firm 
financing and growth, thus calling into question claims that trade credit exists only to reduce 
transaction costs.  This certainly does not detract from the importance of financial development 
as an engine of growth: as we have emphasized, our argument is driven by the assumption that 
firms view trade credit as a second-best alternative to bank financing.  Furthermore, our results 
on new firm growth imply that, in some sense, trade credit is less ‘democratic’ than bank 
financing in promoting growth, which may raise concerns about fostering industry competition 
and may also have distributional implications.  Still, our work highlights the fact that in the face 
of adverse circumstances, firms are effective in finding substitutes to poorly developed 
institutions.  The substitution of trade credit for formal bank financing is just one example, and 
we leave similar analyses along other dimensions as possibilities for future work. 
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